Development Towns in Israel: The Role of Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities in Labor Force Characteristics by Spilerman, Seymour & Habib, Jack
Development Towns in Israel: The Role of 
Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities 
in Labor Force Characteristics' 
Seymour Spilerman 
University of Wisconsin 
Jack Habib 
Brookdale Institute of Gerontology 
and Adult Human Development, Jerusalem 
This paper investigates the contribution of community to ethnic 
stratification i Israel. We show that "development owns," a cate- 
gory of new settlements established to achieve population dispersal 
and immigrant absorption, have influenced (a) the areal distribu- 
tions of different e hnic (country-of-origin) groups, (b) the tendency 
for each group to be concentrated in certain industries, and (c) the 
occupational opportunities available to the members of an ethnic 
population. We also review the relevance of this analysis for under- 
standing ethnic stratification i America. 
INTRODUCTION 
Urban communities in Israel have not attracted particular attention as 
research sites. In part, this is because there are more novel settlement 
patterns, found only in that country, such as the kibbutz (agricultural 
collective) and the moshav (small-holders' cooperative). These forms of 
rural community have been studied intensively, in regard to work organi- 
zation (Spiro 1970), productivity of the economy (Barkai 1974), decision 
making (Cohen 1968), family structure (Talmon 1972; Weintraub and 
Shapira 1971), and child-rearing practices (Bettelheim 1969). It is the 
case, however, that Israeli urban settlements provide convenient sites for 
investigating a number of topics that are of interest o urban specialists, 
especially issues which relate to planned community development. The 
country's new towns, which were established in large numbers beginning 
in the late 1940s, permit one to evaluate the various strategies that have 
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been employed in attempting to put together a viable community de novo: 
which industries can be implanted successfully in outlying areas, what 
mixes of settler backgrounds will produce socially integrated communities, 
and what kinds of local political institutions tend to operate effectively in
the early stages of development of a new settlement. 
The pattern of Israel's urban growth has been a matter of much con- 
cern to governmental uthorities. At the time of the country's founding, 
in 1948, 63% of the population was concentrated in three main cities- 
Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem-and in their immediate nvirons. Exacer- 
bating this population imbalance, a vast immigration in the early years 
of the state threatened to create massive congestion in the urban centers, 
taxing their physical plants, the absorption potentials of their labor mar- 
kets, and their social service capabilities, unless many of the immigrants 
could be motivated to settle outside the metropolitan regions. 
Israel is a society with a considerable tradition of social planning and 
centralized ecision making, dating to the imperatives of existence in the 
prestate period. The government, consequently, was in a position to under- 
take far-reaching decisions concerning population redistribution, and did 
so within months of the establishment of the state, committing extensive 
resources to this task. The instrument to accomplish population redistribu- 
tion was to be a network of small and medium-sized urban settlements, 
located away from the densely populated coastal plain; these settlements 
have since become known as "development owns." 
The new towns have been a focus of much concern. They are populated 
by recent immigrants, particularly from less developed lands. Many are 
isolated, outside the main stream of Israeli society geographically as well 
as socially. For these reasons, the settlements constitute, in many respects, 
a second and inferior Israel. What we wish to accomplish here in regard 
to the towns is twofold: we want to describe their evolution and their 
problems, and in doing so we intend to view them as strategic sites for 
addressing an issue in ethnic stratification the effect which community 
can have in producing ethnic disparities in labor market characteristics. 
Specifically, we consider how the creation of these settlements has influ- 
enced (a) the areal distributions of different ethnic (country-of-origin) 
groups, (b) the tendency for each group to be concentrated in certain in- 
dustries, and (c) the occupational opportunities available to the members 
of an ethnic population. In the concluding section we review the relevance 
of these considerations for understanding the role of community in ethnic 
stratification i America. 
DEVELOPMENT TOWNS IN ISRAEL 
Settlement patterns in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in prestate Pal- 
estine, were influenced by an ideology which invested land reclamation and 
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Jewish manual labor with great significance. The erection of agricultural 
settlements was therefore consistent with the tenets of labor Zionism, as 
well as having a basis in strategic considerations, in that it established 
Jewish rights to land in outlying regions through purchase and cultivation. 
Yet, as Cohen (1970, pp. 2-7) has remarked, in modern times the Jewish 
population in Palestine was never more than 30% rural, a fact that was 
ignored in early Zionist writings, in which little attention was given to the 
role of cities in a modern economy, or to their potential importance in the 
state which was to be created. 
This situation changed abruptly following the establishment of Israel. 
In the three years subsequent to the termination of the British mandate, 
an influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, fleeing from persecution 
in Europe and the Arab countries, more than doubled the population of the 
state. In prior occupations, these immigrants had been predominantly arti- 
sans and small shopkeepers; they came to Israel as refugees, not out of an 
ideological conviction which might sustain them while adapting to the 
harsh life of an agricultural laborer. It was soon recognized by governmen- 
tal authorities2 that residential quarters would have to be constructed in 
large numbers, in urban areas, to accommodate the immigrants. In order 
to relieve the congestion in Tel Aviv and Haifa resulting from very rapid 
population growth, and open the hinterland to settlement, industrialization, 
and mineral exploitation, the government adopted a policy of establish- 
ing new towns principally outside the periphery of Israel's metropolitan 
centers.3 
783 
2 "The authorities did not turn their efforts to urban development out of their own 
free choice; this decision was forced upon them by the circumstances of immigration 
and settlement which emerged after the establishment of the state" (Cohen 1970, 
p. 33). Within two months of the creation of Israel, a National Planning Department 
was opened in the Ministry of Labor. Its principal objective was to initiate comprehen- 
sive settlement planning on a country-wide basis, as well as on a regional and local 
level (Brutzkus 1964, pp. 12-13). 
The mechanics of immigrant settlement involves the cooperation of a private 
institution and several governmental ministries. The Jewish Agency, which fulfilled 
the tasks of refugee transportation and settlement during the mandate period, is still 
responsible for attracting new immigrants and for the initial stages of their absorp- 
tion. The responsibility for planning and developing new towns is now divided mainly 
among three ministries-Labor, Housing, and Commerce and Industry-coordinated by 
an interministerial committee (Lichfield 1971, 1:3.2-3.10). 
3The dependence of immigrants on public agencies offered a unique opportunity for 
altering the settlement pattern existing at the creation of the state. Between 1949 and 
1967 seven schemes for population dispersal were drawn up and revised by the Plan- 
ning Department, each scheme looking 10-20 years into the future. As summarized in 
Lichfield (1971, 1:3.7), the thrust of the government's policy has been to (a) reduce 
the urban concentration in the coastal belt between Tel Aviv and Haifa, (b) disperse 
settlements throughout he country in order to develop the land, (c) establish balanced 
regions through an integrated hierarchical structure of interdependent urban and 
rural settlements, and (d) aid in absorbing and assimilating large numbers of immi- 
grants by providing housing and employment. 
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There is no consistent definition of a development own in the literature 
on Israeli settlements, though the intention is to signify urban settlements 
which lie outside metropolitan regions and which were established by de- 
sign, since 1948, and with considerable governmental ssistance.4 The 1961 
Israel Census of Population, the most recent census available, does not 
employ this term and distinguishes instead between veteran and new com- 
munities. "New" communities include those founded after 1948, whether 
in outlying areas or in the suburban periphery, as well as a number of 
older settlements which have experienced the major portion of their popu- 
lation growth since the creation of Israel. According to the census, 38 new 
settlements5 existed in 1961, with a combined population of 398,000. Other 
governmental gencies use the term "development own" to refer to new 
communities distant from metropolitan areas; yet there are differences 
with respect to the settlements each includes in this category. A report 
written for the Ministry of Labor (Smith 1972, p. 17) lists 24 communi- 
ties,6 with 246,000 residents in 1961. A report prepared for the Ministry 
of Housing (Lichfield 1971, 2:1) records 25 settlements, with 289,000 
inhabitants in 1961. Nongovernmental researchers also differ in terminol- 
ogy and settlement classification: Spiegal (1966, p. 34) cites 24 "new 
towns," with a combined population of 271,000 in 1961. Because suburban 
settlements are excluded, her specification corresponds to the notion of a 
development own. Amiran and Shachar (1969, table 4) list 28 develop- 
ment towns as of 1961, with a total population of 312,000. 
The differences among these classifications result from decisions con- 
cerning which of the communities existing before 1948 should be consid- 
784 
4 In many instances the founding of a new town was preceded by comprehensive 
planning of physical facilities, industrial composition, and population growth. During 
the years of mass immigration, the tendency was to provide refugees who lacked 
skills or capital with housing and employment in these settlements. Various govern- 
mental agencies were involved in building the towns, and attracting industrial enter- 
prises through the provision of tax incentives and loans on favorable terms. Politically, 
local municipal responsibility has generally been slow to develop, all decisions initially 
resting with the central government. For many years afterward a division of power 
over municipal affairs existed between the central and local authorities (Lichfield 1971, 
1:4.12-4.15; Matras 1973, pp. 5-9). 
5 This number refers to urban communities (31) and large villages (seven). An urban 
community is one containing more than 2,000 inhabitants and having at least two- 
thirds of its labor force not engaged in agriculture. A large village is a settlement with 
more than 2,000 inhabitants which does not satisfy the industrial requirement. Large 
villages are included in our tabulation because five of the seven settlements appear on 
some list of development towns. Settlement definitions are reported in Israel Central 
Bureau of Statistics (1966, pp. 21-23; 1965, pp. 61-63). 
6The population figures which follow are adjusted to 1961 so that they will be com- 
parable to the census values. For the same reason, settlements with fewer than 2,000 
inhabitants in 1961 have been deleted from the tabulations. 
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ered "developmental," and which settlements that were initially in this 
category should be viewed as having outgrown the label, in that they no 
longer receive extensive financial assistance from the central government. 
Where we are in a position to calculate indices from census data, we will 
use the list of communities proposed by Amiran and Shachar. Their defini- 
tion covers settlements that were established after 1948, whether founded 
on entirely new sites or brought into being as a result of an influx of new 
populations into towns that had been vacated by Arab residents (Amiran 
and Shachar 1969, p. 1). Suburbs are omitted from the list, although one 
town (Tirat HaKarmel), which now is in the Haifa metropolitan region, 
is included. Also, they retain settlements that have progressed successfully, 
a consideration that is important, since we wish to discuss ethnic composi- 
tion and industrial structure in the full array of communities which were 
planned to achieve population redistribution and immigrant absorption. 
Where we refer to statistics from other studies, the development owns to 
which the figures pertain will be somewhat different from Amiran and 
Shachar's list, in accordance with the comments in the preceding paragraph. 
The growth of development owns, and the impact which these settle- 
ments have had on the distribution of the urban population, is reported in 
table 1. The entries in the second row reveal that the considerable popula- 
tion expansion in the country since 1948 has been accompanied by an 
increase in proportion urban, from 73.3% to 84.4%. The decline in the 
early years of the time series, incidentally, is due to the establishment of 
many development owns during this interval; initially, they were too 
small to be categorized as urban in the census. For our purpose, a more 
important rend concerns the massive population increase in the develop- 
ment towns and the population redistribution resulting from this growth 
(last row), even during a period when all urban communities were ex- 
panding. Indeed, the last two rows of the table, in combination, suggest 
that the redistribution policies of the government were most successful, 
since the proportion of the urban population residing outside the three 
metropolitan areas increased from 14% in 1948 to 48% in 1972, with the 
bulk of this change deriving from the growth of development owns. 
The Concentration of Immigrant Groups in 
Development Towns 
The growth of new towns, and the population redistribution which was 
occasioned by this growth, did not arise principally from internal migra- 
tion. Rather, new immigrants were encouraged to settle in development 
towns, with subsidized housing, low-interest loans, and the promise of 
employment serving as inducements. The outcome of this process was that, 
785 
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in 1961, 67%o of the population7 in development owns consisted of recent 
immigrants o the country, arrivals since 1948, in comparison with 45% in 
the total Israeli population (36% in the main cities). Such great concentra- 
tions of recent immigrants, in communities that are also growing rapidly, 
could be expected to create massive problems of acculturation, and in the 
provision of housing, suitable jobs, and the many social services which a 
refugee population would require. Very great problems till exist in these 
towns; some will be discussed in the concluding section. Yet the settlement 
program was conducted within a framework of extensive assistance to the 
new communities by the central government. Also, the facts that Zionist 
ideology encouraged the ingathering of Jews, that many of the "veterans" 
were themselves immigrants in an earlier decade, and that Israeli culture 
was in the process of being molded during the initial years of the state, 
made for tolerance of the variety of life-styles brought by the immigrants, 
and a willingness to accept them as Israelis even while they were only 
marginally acculturated to the mores of the society. 
We wish to focus on how development owns have patterned the indus- 
try affiliations of the immigrant groups and influenced their consequent 
occupational distributions. For this purpose it will be useful to delineate 
two aspects of residence location: representation of a population group in 
a settlement category, and variability of its concentration among settle- 
ments within the category. The latter factor speaks to the possibility that 
individual communities may "specialize" in particular industrial activities. 
In regard to the first point, we note that not only are development owns 
places of concentration of recent immigrants, but that great differences 
exist between these settlements and other urban communities with respect 
to the origins of their foreign-born populations. Continent-of-origin f gures 
are reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 2. From the entries in the two 
top panels it is evident that the population in development owns has been 
drawn, to a very considerable extent, from among Asian-African immi- 
grants. They comprise 66%o of the foreign born, versus 29%O for Euro- 
peans. In reference to their percentages in Israel, Asian-Africans are 
overrepresented by a factor of 1.65, Europeans underrepresented bya fac- 
tor of 0.54 (1.00 = representation at the same rate as in the total popu- 
lation). This suggests that the industrial structures of the towns should 
be especially pertinent o understanding the labor force characteristics of 
Asian-African immigrants. 
An equally important matter concerns differences among settlement types 
in regard to the variability of representation of the immigrant streams in 
the individual communities. This point refers to the fact that the conti- 
nent-of-origin groups are not dispersed evenly, but tend to be concentrated 
787 
7 Since many of the Israeli born would be young children, the percentage foreign born 
in the adult population is much greater. 
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in some settlements and underrepresented in others. To measure variability 
we constructed an index that is analogous to the coefficient of variation 
(Stigler 1966, pp. 294-95). For an array of percentage values {p} we as- 
sess variability by the statistic IV(p) - SD(p) )//p:(1 - ). This index 
compensates for the fact that the standard deviation of a percentage 
(SD [p] ) is constrained to be small when the average is very large or very 
small, and thereby enables comparisons to be made among sets of per- 
centages with different means. Indices of variation in the proportion Asian- 
African are presented for the various settlement categories in the bottom 
panel of column 1.8 The large value for development owns (0.33) means 
that there are greater differences in ethnic composition among settlements 
in this category than among either veteran communities or suburban settle- 
ments. The relevance of this point is that disparities in industrial structure 
which exist among development owns may correspond to the variation in 
location of the continent groups, thereby exposing Asian-African and Euro- 
pean settlers to very different industries and occupational opportunities. 
Continent of origin is hardly a sensitive measure of cultural homogene- 
ity, although this distinction is a salient one in Israeli life. Country of 
origin is a more important consideration; it signifies language and life-style, 
and it is at this level that ethnic identity is commonly specified. Columns 
3-12 report representation values by settlement ype for several ethnic 
groups (top panel), and these figures tandardized by the respective na- 
tional percentages (middle panel). It is apparent from the latter that each 
Asian-African group is overrepresented indevelopment owns (entry > 1) 
and, with few exceptions, underrepresented in metropolitan centers and 
suburbs. The reverse situation characterizes the locations of most Euro- 
pean populations. Superimposed upon this pattern are some sizable differ- 
ences among the individual ethnic groups: the concentration of Moroccan- 
Algerian-Tunisian immigrants in development owns is especially high 
(2.48 times their representation in Israel); the presence of Yemenites 
(1.10) indicates near equality to their percentage in the country, while 
immigrants from Germany-Austria are grossly underrepresented in the 
towns (0.25). 
The variation in ethnic group concentration also speaks to the matter 
of labor force characteristics of these populations. The index values re- 
ported in the lower panel of table 2 show, in every instance, greater vari- 
ability among development owns than among settlements in the other 
categories. It also appears that the individual Asian-African ethnics are 
apt to concentrate in certain towns, while the European groups are more 
evenly dispersed (compare cols. 3-7 with 8-12, last row). (Indeed, the 
789 
8 Since IV(p) = IV(1 -p), the index of variation is identical for the two continent- 
of-origin groups, except for the effect of the origin-unknown population. 
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index values for the Asian-African populations tend to be larger in every 
settlement category.) As we noted for the continent-of-origin roups, these 
observations uggest that whatever differences in industrial structure are 
present among development owns, they may have considerable impact 
on the industry affiliations of a number of the ethnics, by exposing them 
disproportionately to particular labor market opportunities. Any such ef- 
fect should be greater for the Asian-African populations, because these 
groups are overrepresented in the towns, and because they exhibit a larger 
variation than Europeans in concentration by settlement. 
Time of Immigration and Concentration in 
Particular Development Towns 
Although it is a digression from our main theme-to show the impact of 
development owns on the industrial and occupational opportunities of the 
various ethnics-it is of interest to understand how the concentration of 
individual immigrant groups in certain settlements came about. The rele- 
vant facts are: (a) the ethnic groups arrived in Israel in large numbers in 
different years, and (b) the development owns were established and 
experienced their periods of maximum population growth at different times. 
The tendency for the country-of-origin roups to differ in year of arrival 
to Israel is documented in table 3. The first wo columns report immigra- 
tion to Israel by continent of origin; column 3 shows the ratio of European 
to Asia-African immigrants. There are several clusters of years during 
which new arrivals came disproportionately from one continent. The bulk 
of immigrants in the prestate period came from European countries, a
trend which continued into the first wo years of the state's existence, when 
the survivors of the Nazi extermination camps comprised the majority of 
newcomers. Following this period there was an eight-year interval when 
immigrants came from the Arab countries at approximately three times the 
rate from Europe. The ancient Jewish communities of Iraq, Yemen, and 
Aden moved to Israel, practically in their entireties, in these years. Several 
additional shifts followed in the dominance of a continent as a source of 
immigrants. These shifts frequently accompanied political upheavals in 
particular lands, and reflected the impact of those events on their Jewish 
populations.9 
The dominant period of arrival of immigrants from the individual coun- 
tries is more relevant o the issue of ethnic group concentration i  different 
towns. In columns 4-7 we present immigration distributions for a few 
790 
" Immigration from Morocco intensified after it achieved independence in 1956. Follow- 
ing the Hungarian revolution in 1956, tens of thousands of Jews fled to Austria; many 
eventually came to Israel. Recent immigration from Poland is related to the introduc- 
tion of an anti-Semitic campaign following the Six-Day War in 1967. 
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TABLE 3 





Europe Africa (1)1(2) Romania Bulgaria Iraq Iran 
YEAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1932-38 ...... 175.7 17.5 10.49 10.6 1.1 2.9 1.7 
1939-45 ...... 63.0 14.2 4.50 8.9 3.2 1.5 0.4 
1946-48* 48.5 2.0 24.25 16.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 
1948t-49 ..... 200.3 123.7 1.61 31.3 35.1 1.7 1.8 
1950-51 ...... 136.0 207.0 0.66 86.6 2.1 121.6 20.0 
1952-53 ...... 10.3 25.1 0.40 3.8 0.8 1.6 5.3 
1954-55 ...... 5.9 49.8 0.12 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 
1956-57 ...... 48.8 77.9 0.63 1.6 0.2 0.4 1.8 
1958-59 ..... 30.7 20.0 1.55 17.6 0.2 0.2 7.2 
1960-61 ...... 42.3 29.4 1.45 28.8 0.3 0.3 1.4 
1962-63 ...... 34.1 91.2 0.37 20.0 0.2 0.3 5.1 
1964-65 ...... 48.2 36.9 1.33 23.4 0.1 0.1 5.6 
1966-67 ...... 14.4 15.2 0.95 1.4 
1968-69 ...... 27.4 30.2 0.91 3.1 
1970-71 ...... 54.2 23.7 2.28 3.1 
1972 ......... 48.1 7.6 6.33 0.9 
SOURCES.-Sicron (1957, pp. 2, 6): Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (1973b, pp. 16-19). 
* Until end of the mandate period. 
t From day of establishment of Israel (AMay 14, 1948). 
$ Data are not published. 
countries of origin to illustrate the range of patterns that exist concerning 
time of arrival in Israel. These distributions show that for some ethnics 
(e.g., Bulgarians, Iraqis) immigration to Israel was compressed into a very 
brief interval, although the specific years may vary among the groups. 
Other ethnics (e.g., Iranians) show less concentration i  time; their popu- 
lations have arrived in sizable numbers over much of the lifetime of the 
state. Still other origin countries (e.g., Romania) exhibit arrival patterns 
which have several modes. 
The tendency for period of immigration to have influenced the location 
of the individual ethnics in different development owns can be investigated 
by comparing the concentration of a group in the settlements that were 
growing rapidly during its years of maximum immigration, with the group's 
representation i all development towns. To pursue this matter we specified 
periods of substantial immigration to Israel for each ethnic group, and 
periods of rapid population growth for every town. A period of substantial 
immigration was defined as several adjacent years during which at least 
50% of the group's population in 1961, the census year, arrived in the 
country. Alternatively, an ethnic group could have more than one period 
of substantial immigration ifat least one-quarter of its population in 1961 
arrived in each time period. The periods were specified so as to maximize 
791 
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differences among the ethnic groups in terms of this classification. That is, 
for analytic purposes, we wanted to define several time periods, with the 
individual ethnics dispersed among them. Due to annual fluctuations in 
the size of the total immigration stream, our intervals vary in duration 
from two to five years. The four time periods that were specified, together 
with the ethnics which experienced substantial immigration in each, are 
reported in table 4. 
TABLE 4 
ETHNIC GROUP CONCENTRATION IN DEVELOPMENT TOWNS,* BY PERIOD 
OF ARRIVAL TO ISRAEL, 1961 
Proportion of Ethnic 
Group's Development 
Town Population That Is Expected Proportion of Overrepresentation of 
Ethnic Group with Large in Settlements Which Ethnic Group in Ethnic Group in Rapidly 
Population Proportion Grew Rapidly in Rapidly Growing Growing Development 
Immigrating to Israel Time Period$ Development Towns? Towns. (1) - (2) 
in Indicated Periodt (1) (2) (3) 
1948-4911 
Lybia# ................ .215 .288 -.073 
Turkey# .............. .350 .288 .062 
Yemen ................ .717 .288 .429 
Bulgaria .............. .736 .288 .448 
Poland ................ .391 .288 .103 
1950-51** 
Egypt (Lybia) tt ...... .834 .570 .264 
Iran# ................. .438 .570 -.132 
Iraq .. .799 .570 .299 
Romania .............. .701 .570 .131 
1954-56:: 
Morocco# ............. .501 .413 .088 
1957-61?? 
Egypt# ............... .260 .246 .014 
Poland ................ .2 70 .246 .024 
Romania .............. .291 .246 .045 
SOURCES.-Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (1973b, table 3; 1964, table 10; 1963b, table 2), 
Amiran and Shachar (1969, table 4). 
* Computations peitain to the 19 development owns with populations exceeding 5,000 in 1961. t "Large population proportion" is defined as more than one-half of the group's population in Israel 
in 1961 arriving in indicated period (if ethnic group appears in one time interval), or more than 
one-quarter of group's population arriving in the period (if ethnic group appears in two time intervals). 
: A "rapidly growing town" is one with more than one-third of its 1961 population accounted for by 
expansion in the indicated period (if settlement appears in one time interval), or more than one-quarter 
of its population accounted for by expansion in the period (if settlement appears in more than one time 
interval). 
? Entry is the proportion of the total population in development owns in 1961 that is in settlements 
which grew rapidly in the time period. 
1I Rapidly growing development owns in this period Akko, Lod, Ramla, Rosh HaAyin, Yehud. 
# In some census data used in our calculations (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1964, table 10) 
this ethnic group is paired with another which did not have a high immigration rate in the period. ** Rapidly growing development owns in this period* Akko, Afula, Ashkelon, Beer Sheva, Or Yehuda, 
Tiberias, Tirat Hakarmel, Zef at. 
tt Egypt and Lybia, which are grouped in the census data, each satisfied the criterion for inclusion 
in this time period. 
:4 Rapidly growing development owns in this period: Ashkelon, Beer Sheva, Bet Shaan, Bet Shemesh, 
Dimona, Qiryat Shemona, Yavne. 
?? Rapidly growing development owns in this period: Beer Sheva, Dimona, Elat, Qiryat Gat. 
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Rapidly growing development owns were defined as places which ob- 
tained at least one-third of their 1961 populations in the indicated time 
period. Alternatively, a town was considered to have multiple periods of 
rapid growth if it obtained at least 25%fo f its 1961 population in each of 
several intervals. Using these definitions we calculated the proportion of an 
ethnic group's development own population in 1961 which resided in set- 
tlements that were growing rapidly when its members had a high rate of 
immigration to Israel. This value is reported in column, 1 of table 4. In 
column 2 we present he proportion which would reside in these settlements 
if the group were represented equally in all development owns. Column 3 
shows the difference between the entries in the preceding columns, and 
measures the extent of overrepresentation in the towns that were expand- 
ing rapidly. 
These calculations support the argument that the ethnics tend to be 
concentrated in settlements which have growth histories that parallel 
their immigration distributions. Eleven of the 13 entries in column 3 are 
positive, indicating overrepresentation i  rapidly expanding towns. Also, 
the two instances in which a column 3 entry is negative refer to situations 
where the ethnic group under consideration is paired in the census data 
with a second group, one lacking a high immigration rate in the referenced 
time period. In these cases our calculations cannot provide a sensitive test 
of the thesis.'0 
THE INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTIONS AND OCCUPATIONAL 
STANDINGS OF THE ETHNIC GROUPS 
To this point our argument has been to the effect hat as a consequence of 
a variety of arrival times in Israel by the individual ethnic groups, in com- 
bination with different periods of rapid population growth by the develop- 
ment towns, each immigrant population tends to be concentrated in 
particular settlements. The next consideration that we address concerns the 
tendency for a development town to "specialize" in certain industries, in 
the sense that its firms are grossly overrepresented in the labor force of 
the settlement, and the effect which this situation has on the industry 
affiliations of the individual ethnics. 
There are a number of reasons for a lack of industrial diversity within 
development towns. First, most of the settlements are quite small; only 
six of the 28 on Amiran and Shachar's (1969, table 4) list had more than 
15,000 inhabitants in 1961. This fact, alone, limits the number of industries 
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10 In contrast, three of the four largest entries in column 3 pertain to groups (Yemen, 
Bulgaria, Iraq) whose arrival patterns are characterized by "spikes"; that is, prac- 
tically their entire populations emigrated during a very brief interval. This situation 
permits the cleanest test of the correspondence. 
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which a town can support. Second, the national government has followed a
policy of extending incentives for certain kinds of industries to locate in 
development owns. Third, the preferred industries tend to have large 
plants;" this also serves to reduce the variety of firms in a settlement. 
Governmental encouragement of industry is carried out through a plan 
of financial incentives administered by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. For locating in a development own, firms are granted tax re- 
ductions and low-interest loans for site acquisition, site development, on- 
the-job training of workers, and working capital (Lichfield 1971, 1:3.13). 
The kinds of industries that have been given preference are ones which 
either exploit the resources of a region-food-processing plants in agri- 
cultural locales, mining and chemical manufacturing in towns near the 
Dead Sea-or ones which, while neutral to location, are labor intensive 
and provide many jobs at a low initial capital cost. Textile manufacturing 
has been the most favored industry; the short training period for spinning 
and weaving jobs makes these tasks especially suitable for accommodating 
low-skill immigrants. 
The impact of the factors which make for industrial concentration can 
be illustrated by reference to the economies of a few development owns. 
In Qiryat Shemona, 71% of industrial employment is in textile manu- 
facturing; this figure represents one-fourth of the total labor force in the 
city'2 (Zarchi and Shiskin 1972, pp. 61, 84). In Dimona, textile plants also 
dominate the manufacturing sector: 96% of industrial workers, repre- 
senting 50%o of the labor force, are in these enterprises. Ashqelon special- 
izes in food processing (46%o of industrial employment); Bet Shemesh 
manufactures transportation equipment (40% of the industrial labor 
force); Afula weaves textiles (57% of the industrial work force); and the 
economy of Yeruham, a new development own, is based principally on 
chemical and mineral processing (92% of industrial employment). While 
it is true that the preceding examples depict extreme instances of un- 
balanced economic structures, they only exaggerate what is an evident 
tendency. 
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11 There is an evident tendency for plant size in development towns to exceed plant 
size in other settlements. In 1967, 18.2% of plants in development towns employed 100 
or more persons; the comparable figure for the country was 4.4%. In regard to the 
labor force, 69% of industrial employment in the towns was in these large plants, 
versus 43% for the country (Berler 1970, p. 115). To a considerable extent, the con- 
centration of large plants in development towns is due to the kinds of industries 
which have located there: food processing and packing, textile manufacturing, potash 
and chemical works, and cement products. Spiegal (1966, p. 51) adds that the govern- 
ment has preferred to negotiate with a few big enterprises rather than with many 
small ones. 
12 This statistic is for 1971. Other figures in this paragraph pertain to 1968, and are 
from Lichfield (1971, 3:202, 160, 122, 41, 216). 
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As a result of community differences in industrial composition, the in- 
dividual ethnic groups tend to be overrepresented in certain activities. 
Yemenites are concentrated in textile manufacturing (three times their 
representation i the Israeli population), Moroccans are in mining (four 
times their representation), Lybians manufacture cement products (four 
times their representation), and immigrants from Algeria-Tunisia re em- 
ployed disproportionately (by a factor of three) in wood product indus- 
tries.13 The overrepresentation of those immigrant groups can be attributed 
to the particular development owns where they reside. Veteran settlements 
play much the same sort of role, but tend to expose European ethnics to 
certain industrial sectors. Germans are overrepresented (by a factor of two) 
in chemical and petroleum processing, an industry which has a major center 
in the Haifa Bay region, where this group is concentrated. Bulgarians, who 
reside principally in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, are overrepresented 
(by a factor of two) in machinery and metal products manufacturing, 
an economic sector with a strong representation i this region. 
To inquire in a more systematic fashion into the impact of community 
on the industry affiliations of the ethnic groups, indices of dissimilarity 
(Taeuber and Taeuber 1965, p. 236) were computed from the 1961 census 
tape to compare the industry distribution of each immigrant group with 
that of the urban population. For ethnic group j, this measure is defined by 
IDj - .50)2P,J - Pi.1, where P,j the proportion of group j's urban 
population in industry i,Pi. the proportion of the total urban population 
in industry i, and the subscript i ranges over the two-digit census industry 
categories. The index ID, varies from 0 to 1, and has an interpretation as
the proportion of persons in ethnic group j who would have to change 
their industry affiliations in order for the two distributions to be in 
agreement. 
Index values for the individual ethnic groups are reported in column 1 
of table 5. These figures document a rather consistent endency for Asian- 
African ethnics to show greater discrepancies from the urban population 
in their industry distributions than is the norm for European groups. When 
continent of origin, as a summary measure, is considered, Asian-African 
immigrants exhibit almost twice the disparity of Europeans14 (.13 versus 
795 
13 Calculations are from the 1961 census tape, and refer to three-digit industry codes. 
14 A problem exists in comparing the dissimilarities of subpopulations with a parent 
population. In the present application, the urban population consists of Asian-Africans 
(28%7), Europeans (35%7), and Israeli born plus continent unknown (37%). Since 
Europeans constitute a larger percentage of the urban population than Asian-Africans, 
they should have a smaller index value. However, because the deleted group is the 
largest numerically, and because the two foreign-born groups are similar in size, the 
index values are not simply artifacts of the composition of the urban population. With 
respect to the individual ethnic groups, this consideration is of negligible importance, 
since each comprises a very small percentage of the urban population. 
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TABLE 5 
DEGREE OF DISPARITY BETWEEN INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE ETHNIC GROUPS 
IN URBAN AREAS AND TOTAL URBAN POPULATION, 1961 
DEVELOPMENT TOWNS 
ALL URBAN SETTLEMENTS 
Ethnic Group 
Percentage Percentage Proportion in 
Explained Explained Development 
ID* by Communityt ID* by Communityt Towns 
ETHNIC GROUP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Turkey ............ .17 .06 .26 .38 .23 
Iran ............... .28 .12 .50 .45 .24 
Iraq ............... .13 .15 .26 .56 .19 
Yemen-Aden ....... .28 .18 .39 .59 .20 
Morocco ... ......... .23 .26 .31 .58 .46 
Algeria-Tunisia ..... .25 .29 .32 .46 .63 
Egypt ............. .21 .04 .30 .12 .21 
Lybia .............. .28 .21 .40 .37 .26 
Russia ............. .11 .07 .2 5 -.07 .05 
Poland ............. .10 .07 .23 .31 .06 
Germany-Austria ... . .21 .10 .40 .07 .04 
Czechoslovakia ...... .15 .05 .33 .02 .07 
Hungary ........... .14 .00 .2 7 -.03 .14 
Romania ........... .10 .04 .22 .29 .15 
Bulgaria ........... .18 .13 .31 .18 .12 
Asian-African ...... .13 .25 .26 .70 .27 
European .......... .07 .12 .18 .29 .08 
SOuRcE.-Computations are from the 1961 census tape, for males aged 14 and older, and pertain to 
communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1961. * For ethnic group j, IDJ = .50 1 P,i-Pi, where Pt, -proportion of group j's urban population 
(development town population) in industry i, and P, = proportion of the total urban population in 
industry i. A 
t Formula is (ID, - IDj)/IDi. See text for details of this computation. Negative values should be 
interpreted as indicating zero importance of community. 
.07). We will indicate, momentarily, that this difference is due to the 
greater representation of the former ethnics in development owns. 
To ascertain the extent to which community industrial structure is 
responsible for the index values, we estimated an expected industry distri- 
bution {Pij} for each ethnic group j, and calculated the degree to which the 
observed istribution for the group is accounted for by this set of estimates. 
The expected distribution was computed as a weighted average of the 
industry distribution i  every community, the weights being the proportions 
of ethnic group j's urban population in the various settlements. These 
figures therefore report the representation which a group would have in 
different industries if its members were employed by them, in every commu- 
nity, at the same rates as the settlement's total labor force. The dissimi- 
larity between the observed and expected industry distributions for group j 
A 
is specified by IDj .50;fPij - Pijl, which measures the residual dis- 
crepancy, the amount not explained by community. The percentage re- 
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duction in the index which can be attributed to community industrial 
structure is (ID - ID,) /IDj. 
The index proportions which are explained by community, in the sense 
of the preceding discussion, are presented in column 2 of table 5. There is 
an evident tendency for residence location to be more important for Asian- 
African groups than for the European ethnics. When continent of origin 
alone is considered, 25% of the discrepancy between the industry distribu- 
tions of Asian-Africans and the total urban population can be attributed 
to the concentration of those immigrants in certain communities; for 
Europeans, the corresponding figure is 12 %. The percentages for the 
individual ethnic groups should also be compared with the indices of varia- 
tion in settlement concentration (table 2, top row of lower panel). Despite 
the lack of full comparability between the ethnic categories in our two 
data sources, there is evidence that the effect of community is greater for 
groups having a large variation in settlement concentration. For instance, 
immigrants from Yemen-Aden and Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia have the 
highest index values of settlement concentration, and the largest percent- 
ages of their industry distributions accounted for by community. This 
correspondence is hardly surprising; it simply illustrates the mechanism 
we have been describing whereby community may create ethnic disparities 
in labor force characteristics. 
What is the impact of development owns on the industry affiliations of 
the ethnic groups? To pursue this matter, the preceding calculations were 
repeated for the 19 development owns identified on the 1961 census tape. 
The index IDj now reports the difference between the industry distribution 
of group j in the development owns, and the industry distribution of 
the total urban population. The results, which are presented in column 3 
of table 5, reveal slightly larger index values for Asian-African ethnics 
than for Europeans; at the level of continent of origin, the respective 
figures are .26 and .18. A more pronounced effect concerns the disparity 
between the index value of an ethnic group in the development owns, 
and its value in all urban settlements (cols. 1 and 3). The figures for 
development owns are consistently larger, suggesting that these settle- 
ments expose their residents to industrial structures that differ considerably 
from the ones existing in other communities.15 This observation, together 
with the greater representation of Asian-African populations in develop- 
ment towns (col. 5), explains the manner by which the towns contribute 
to ethnic differences in industry affiliation (col.1). 
15 Another way to convey this point is by noting the ID value of each settlement 
type. For all residents in a settlement category, as compared with the total urban 
population, the values are .20, .13, .09, and .09, for development towns, veteran 
communities, suburbs, and main cities, respectively. Thus, the divergence from the 
urban population in industry structure is greatest for development towns. 
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The degree to which the index values in column 3 can be attributed to 
the industrial composition of development owns is strikingly different for 
Asian-African and European ethnics. The proportions explained by com- 
munity in the case of the former greatly exceed the proportions for the 
latter groups (col 4).16 At the level of continent of origin, the respective 
figures are .70 and .29. It is also noteworthy that differences among the 
ethnic groups in the effect of community correspond to differences among 
them in degree of concentration i  individual development owns (table 2, 
lower panel, last row). For instance, with regard to Asian-Africans, Yemen- 
Aden immigrants are highest on both concentration by settlement and 
importance of community for explaining their industry distribution, while 
immigrants from Egypt-Lybia are lowest on both factors. The European 
groups exhibit little difference in degree of settlement concentration, al- 
though Romanians do have somewhat higher values on the two indices. 
We conclude that the overrepresentation f Asian-African ethnics in 
development owns (which contain industries different from those common 
elsewhere in the country [n. 15] ), and their further concentration in 
certain of these settlements, has served to expose them, to a disproportion- 
ate extent, to particular industrial opportunities. This situation is re- 
sponsible for the larger disparities between their industry distributions 
and that of the total urban population, in comparison with European 
groups (table 5, col. 1), and for the greater importance of community in 
explaining their industry affiliations (col. 2). 
Impact of Residence Location on the Occupational 
Standings of the Ethnic Groups 
The industrial configuration of a settlement is salient to labor force op- 
portunity for a variety of reasons. Industry determines work satisfaction 
(Blauner 1964), seasonality of employment, and rate of promotion, as well 
as occupational composition. For the narrow purpose of understanding 
settlement differences in the latter factor, however, it is the case that the 
various industrial structures translate into much the same sort of occupa- 
tional distribution for communities within each settlement category. In 
particular, despite the tendency for individual development towns to 
"specialize" in a given industrial activity-textiles, food processing, and 
mineral extraction being the most common-the different towns tend to 
have similar occupational distributions. 
The reasons for this are not difficult to comprehend. We have already 
described the inducements proffered by the central government o firms 
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16 The negative values in this column indicate greater disparity from the industry 
distribution of the total urban population when the community distribution is con- 
sidered. The most reasonable interpretation for these figures is as zeros. 
This content downloaded from 160.39.33.214 on Sat, 21 Dec 2013 10:59:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Development Towns in Israel 
in certain industries, to motivate them to locate in development owns. 
The preference has tended to be for industries that are labor intensive and 
utilize low-skill work forces. Labor-intensive technologies create many 
jobs for a fixed initial capital investment, a matter of importance to a 
country with limited resources in the process of accommodating a large 
refugee population. Low-skill occupations permit immigrants from diverse 
cultural backgrounds to be assimilated into the labor force with a minimum 
of job retraining and language acquisition. With respect to the main urban 
centers, there is evidence from other studies (e.g., Galle 1963, p. 263) 
that major metropolitan places typically have many commercial and ad- 
ministrative functions, which entail sizable white-collar work forces. 
In table 6, columns 1-4 report the average occupational distribution in 
each settlement ype.'7 The results for development owns and the main 
cities confirm our a priori notions. Development towns have few white- 
collar workers (22% of the labor force) while the main cities employ a 
great many (49C0), in comparison with the urban population (41%o). It 
TABLE 6 
OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION- BY COMMUNITY CATEGORY, FOR 
URBAN SETTLEMENTS, 1961 
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION (%)t 
__ _ _ _ _ __ - OCCUPATIONAL 
Upper Lower STATUS SCORES 
White White Upper Lower 
Collar Collar Manual MIanual Observed Predicted 
COMMUNITY CATEGORY (1) (2) (3) (4) Total (5) (6) 
Development towns . 09 .09 .13 .39 .39 1.00 97.5 101.3 
Veteran settlements . 14 . 1  .18 .40 .28 1.00 104.0 106.4 
Suburbs . 1 5. ... .15 .23 .42 .20 1.00 111.7 110.0 
Main cities .23 .23 .26 .33 .18 1.00 114.8 113.0 
All urban 
settlements .18 .18 .23 .37 .22 1.00 109.7 109.7 
SOURCE.-Computations are from the 1961 census tape, for males aged 14 and older, and pertain to 
communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1961. 
* Occupational categories are defined as follows- upper white collar-scientific and academic workers, 
other professional workers, administrators and managers, lower white collar-clerical and sales workers; 
upper manual-skilled workers in industry, mining, building, and skilled workers in agriculture; lower 
manual-unskilled workers in industry, transport, building, other unskilled workers, service workers. 
The components refer to the 1972 occupational classification, to which the 1961 census codes were 
transformed (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1974, appendix B). 
t Entries are unweighted averages of settlement values, with the exception of the last row, which 
leports the occupational distribution of the urban population. 
$ Each of nine major occupational categories was indexed by its median earnings in 1972 (Israel, 
Central Bureau of Statistics 1973a, p. 344). "Observed" status scores are a weighted average of the 
earnings values, the weights being the proportions of the labor force from a settlement type in the 
occupations. "Predicted" status scores were calculated in the same manner except that the occupational 
distribution of a settlement was first estimated from its industry distribution, the estimation being made 
from an industry-by-occupation matrix for the entire urban population. Status scores are in units of 
Israeli currency (IL X 100) and reflect annual occupational earnings in 1972. 
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17 Settlement occupational distributions were estimated from the occupational affilia- 
tions of residents in the respective communities. Our estimates, therefore, are least 
accurate for suburbs. 
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is also the case that development towns have few skilled occupations, when 
this occupational category is viewed relative to the size of the lower manual 
work force. That is, while there are equal numbers of upper and lower 
manual positions, in other settlements the ratio of skilled to unskilled oc- 
cupations is much higher, enhancing the mobility prospects there for lower- 
class workers. Some implications of the restricted occupational opportunity 
in development towns are outlined in the next section. 
We wish to make clear the structural underpinnings of the occupational 
differences among settlement types. The differences derive principally from 
the kinds of industries located in the communities, and relate only indi- 
rectly to the skill levels of the inhabitants. The final two columns of table 
6 provide evidence for this contention. In column 5, "observed" occupa- 
tional status scores are presented for each settlement ype. These scores 
were calculated by classifying the occupations into nine major categories 
for which national earnings data are available,18 and computing a weighted 
average of the earnings figures, the weights being the labor force propor- 
tions in the categories. The resulting scores index occupational standing; 
the value for a community reflects only its occupational composition, not 
the quality of work by practitioners of an occupation or community dif- 
ferences in rate of pay for the same work. The entries indicate that oc- 
cupational status varies considerably by settlement ype, from a low of 
97.5 for development owns to a high of 114.8 for the main cities.19 These 
figures, then, express the preceding distributional information i  more sum- 
mary form. In column 6 estimates of the occupational status scores are 
reported, the calculations being based on the occupational distributions 
characteristic of the various industries,20 and the industry composition of 
each settlement. These scores therefore report the status discrepancy that 
should exist among community types, given their industrial compositions. 
The estimated scores parallel the observed values, and reveal that 11.7 
points from the 17.3-point range in occupational status is expected from 
industry differences among the settlements. 
The fact that the occupational distributions of the communities can be 
800 
18 Earnings data are for 1972 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1973a, p. 344). 
Information on income was not collected in the 1961 census. While earnings figures 
are available for years previous to 1972, they pertain to the one-digit categories of an 
old occupational classification, which is largely an industry classification, and show 
less dispersion than do the figures for the present occupational categories. The two-digit 
1961 occupations were transformed to the 1972 codes using the occupational translation 
key in Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (1974, appendix B). 
19 These calculations, and others in this section, were repeated with occupational 
status being indexed by average education in an occupation. The results were very 
similar to the ones reported in the paper. 
20 An occupational distribution was constructed for each industry using data from the 
entire urban population. 
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understood from a consideration of the kinds of industries they contain 
does not mean that the personal characteristics of residents are irrelevant 
to the determination of occupational composition. Indeed, we have argued 
that the industrial structures of development owns were deliberately 
planned with the needs of their prospective populations in mind. What a 
consideration of columns 5 and 6 reveals is that while the skill levels of 
the inhabitants may have been influential as initial causes in attracting 
certain kinds of enterprises, once an industrial base has been established 
the occupational structure of a settlement is an immediate resultant of its 
mix of industries. Also, since few industries have technologies which can 
accommodate much variety in occupational composition, a settlement 
cannot respond easily to changes in the skill and education levels of its 
residents. 
The impact of community on the magnitude of ethnic differences in 
occupational status is reported in table 7 for the continent-of-origin 
groups.2' Columns 1 and 4 present occupational status scores for each 
ethnic group, by settlement category. These "observed" values were cal- 
culated in the same fashion as the entries in column 5 of table 6, the sole 
difference being that the weights used in computing the occupational 
averages now pertain to proportions of the relevant ethnic group. The fig- 
ures reveal sizable disparities for each group, over the community categories, 
with development owns showing the lowest status scores, and suburbs and 
TABLE 7 
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS* OF THE CONTINENT-OF-ORIGIN GROUPS, 
BY COMMUNITY CATEGORY, 1961 
ASIAN-AFRICAN EUROPEAN 
Proportion Population 
of Group's of Group's 
Observed Expected Urban Observed Expected Urban 
Status Status Population Status Status Population 
COMMUNITY CATEGORY (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Development towns . .... 0.0 96.6 .27 106.4 98.1 .08 
Veteran settlements .. 91.1 103.4 .21 110.5 104.2 .19 
Suburbs . 10............... 110.6 .18 115.3 112.1 .22 
Main cities . 9............. 114.9 .34 119.7 114.7 .51 
All urban 
settlements . .......96.2 106.6 1.00 115.9 110.8 1.00 
SOURCE.-Computations are from the 1961 census tape, for males aged 14 and older, and pertain to 
communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1961. * Status scores were computed in the manner described in n. I of table 6, except that the weights 
now refer, to an ethnic group's proportions in the occupational categories. Scores are in units of Israeli 
currency (IL X 100), and reflect annual occupational earnings in 1972. 
801 
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continent means, and therefore are not presented separately. 
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main cities the highest. Within each settlement ype there also are sub- 
stantial status differences between the immigrant groups: Europeans con- 
sistently have higher occupational standing than Asian-Africans. When all 
urban settlements are considered, a 19.7-point differential is obtained be- 
tween the origin groups. What we wish to ascertain is the extent to which 
this gap is a consequence of the settlement patterns of the two ethnic 
groups. 
Expected status scores were computed for each origin group by assuming 
that, in every community, its members had the same occupational distribu- 
tion as the settlement's total population. This computation therefore in- 
dexes the degree to which an immigrant population is advantaged occu- 
pationally by its community locations. The expected scores are reported 
in columns 2 and 5, and reveal comparable occupational exposure patterns 
for the two ethnic groups within each settlement category. However, 
because Asian-Africans are overrepresented in development owns, while 
Europeans are concentrated in the main cities and suburbs (cols. 3 and 6), 
at the level of the total urban population a significant gap emerges in ex- 
pected occupational status; the score for Asian-Africans i 106.6, and for 
Europeans it is 110.8. This 4.2-point gap, which is attributable to different 
settlement locations by the two ethnics, accounts for 21 % of the observed 
discrepancy in occupational status between the groups. 
In actuality, this 4.2-point gap is an upper bound to the impact of com- 
munity. Our computations have ignored resident characteristics, and 
thereby presume that any settlement differences in years of schooling or 
other job-related skills are, properly, the effects of community; for in- 
stance, lower educational attainment in development owns might be due 
to poor school facilities in these settlements. However, there is evidence 
(next section) that capable individuals tend to migrate from development 
towns. This means that individual attributes are, in part, a determinant 
of settlement location, rather than the reverse. If we adopt this formula- 
tion, the effect of community should be examined net of individual 
characteristics. While we cannot hold these factors constant using the pre- 
ceding methodology, by means of a regression procedure an individual's 
occupational status was examined against terms for (a) ethnic origin, (b) 
education, age, and length of residence in Israel, and (c) 46 dummy terms 
for the settlements. The result was that the initial 19.7-point gap22 between 
Asian-African and European immigrants was reduced to 6.9 points by ad- 
dition of the individual characteristics, and to 4.7 points by the introduc- 
tion of the settlement erms. This last 2.2-point reduction, representing 
22 In the regression formulation, the ethnic gap in occupational status appears as the 
difference between the b coefficients for the two continent-of-origin groups (entered 
as dummy variables). The Israeli-born population is the deleted category. 
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11% of the initial status difference, is a lower bound to the effect of 
community.23 
Settlement location by no means accounts for a major portion of the 
ethnic gap in occupational standing. Sizable disparities exist between the 
groups in education and occupationally relevant skills (Ben Porath 1973), 
and they are responsible for the larger part of the occupational differential. 
Nonetheless, the effect of settlement is not negligible. At the level of the 
individual ethnics, its importance is even greater in certain instances. For 
example, in terms of the more conservative calculation, a 3.8-point 
difference in occupational status is expected between immigrants from 
Russia and Algeria-Tunisia, in favor of the former, on the basis of the 
occupational opportunities available in the communities where each group 
resides. That this settlement effect is due largely to the different representa- 
tions of these two ethnics in development owns may be seen from column 
5 of table 5. 
CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT TOWNS 
We have characterized development towns as locales in which few 
moderate-status positions are available, this limitation deriving from a 
concentration of low-skill industries in the settlements. Relating the occu- 
pational composition of the towns to their demographic features, we have 
suggested that the restricted occupational opportunity in these comunities 
is responsible, in part, for the disparities which exist in Israel in occupa- 
tional standing between immigrants from European and those from non- 
European countries; that is, the latter ethnics, being overrepresented in
the towns, are exposed disproportionately to disadvantageous industrial 
contexts. Yet the impact of development owns on national-level indices of 
the ethnic gap is muted by the fact that even among Asian-Africans, only 
27% of the population resides in this class of settlements. When we turn to 
a consideration of the social character of the towns themselves, however, 
the full impact of the initial decisions concerning the structure of their 
economies becomes evident. 
There is merit to the contention that the government's policy to establish 
new towns in outlying areas, direct large numbers of immigrants to the 
settlements, and introduce in them principally labor-intensive, low-skill 
industries, constituted an efficient s rategy by which a small country with 
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23 The persistence of a community effect, which we note here, means that, despite a 
high migration rate from development towns to communities with better work 
opportunities, many individuals, when confronted with a choice between career and 
ties to family and neighbors, do not choose to maximize occupational prospects. 
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modest resources could cope with several pressing and related problems. 
First, immigrant absorption was a matter of urgency, not something that 
could be deferred or solved gradually, and the introduction of low-skill 
technologies facilitated their rapid incorporation into the labor force. A 
second objective furthered by the new towns was promotion of population 
redistribution a d the opening of the hinterland to development. This was 
easier to achieve through encouraging new immigrants, who had few ties 
with communities in Israel, to settle in the towns, than through stimulating 
the migration of veteran Israelis from the country's metropolitan centers. 
Nevertheless, substantial disutilities can be associated with the new-town 
policy once a longer-range time perspective is adopted. Pertaining to this 
matter, we wish to discuss several immediate consequences of the labor 
force composition of development owns, as well as a number of derivative, 
second-order problems. 
The direct consequences of limited opportunity are that immigrants who 
come to the towns with training which qualifies them for skilled manual or 
lower white-collar positions have difficulty in locating suitable work, and 
residents who begin their careers in low-ranked jobs have limited prospects 
for upward mobility. An indication of the seriousness of the blockage in 
occupational mobility, even for poorly educated persons, can be seen by 
noting that in the two medium-status categories underrepresented in the 
towns (skilled manual and lower white collar),24 58% of the country's 
labor force in the former category, and 29% of the labor force in the latter, 
have eight or fewer years of education (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 
1973a, pp. 336-37). This means that it is not uncommon for capable in- 
dividuals with little education to enter these occupations. To summarize, 
while the industries established in development owns may be appropriate 
to the skill level of the average immigrant, they severely constrain the 
occupational prospects of the better-educated or more motivated settlers. 
Partly as a consequence of limited occupational opportunity, there has 
been considerable migration from development owns. A report on 21 
towns (Israel Manpower Planning Authority 1964, p. 6) notes that 40% 
of their population in 1961 moved out of this settlement category in the 
succeeding two years; this figure was four times the national rate of inter- 
urban movement. There is also evidence that the migrants come from the 
more talented segment of the community:25 they are better educated than 
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24 "Skilled manual" refers to the census occupational category-skilled workers in 
industry, mining, building, and transport; and to part of the census category-agricul- 
tural workers. "Lower white collar" refers to two occupational categories-clerical and 
related workers, and sales workers (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1974). 
25 Data are from tabulations prepared by the authors from the 1961 census tape. 
Occupational status is indexed by 1972 earnings figures for the one-digit census 
occupation categories. Facility with Hebrew is based on a census tape code which 
refers simultaneously to reading and writing competence. 
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nonmigrants (7.6 years of schooling vs. 6.2), have higher current occupa- 
tional status (103 vs. 96), are more facile with Hebrew (74% can read 
and write vs. 65%), and have been in Israel for a longer period (11.4 years 
vs. 11.0).26 There is little migration to development owns from veteran 
settlements, which might offset this loss of capable residents.27 Rather, 
these towns have functioned as ports of entry for new immigrants to the 
country, providing them with temporary places of abode until they acquire 
the means to establish themselves in other communities. Those who remain 
tend to have modest occupational aspirations or require the housing sub- 
sidies and other kinds of assistance that are more readily available to 
residents of development towns. To put matters uccinctly, the towns serve 
as "sinks" for less resourceful immigrants. 
An additional process appears to operate in development owns within 
commuting distance of veteran settlements. Residents who are better 
qualified occupationally frequently obtain employment outside the towns 
and travel to work, much as if they lived in suburbs. From the 1961 census 
tape we calculated that, for the industrial labor force28 residing in develop- 
ment towns, mean education of males employed outside their settlements 
is 7.4 years, compared with 6.9 years for those residing and working in 
the towns. It is unclear from our data whether the existence of suitable 
employment in nearby communities permits development owns to retain 
these individuals, or whether it facilitates their eventual departure by 
enabling the withdrawal to be accomplished in stages. To some extent the 
latter process probably operates, since many of the settlements are not 
very attractive, and their inhabitants often have only a weak identification 
with community (Lichfield 1971, 1:6.3, 6.10). In this regard we point out 
that, alongside the departure of skilled manual and lower white-collar 
workers, development owns tend to have nonresident professional and 
administrative work forces (Smith 1972, p. 34). Teachers, social workers, 
and industrial managers choose to commute to work rather than reside 
in the towns. Our calculations from the 1961 census tape provide support- 
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26 We point out that the higher scores of migrants are not just a consequence of 
geographic mobility being more common among better-situated persons. Individuals 
who moved to another development town tend to have lower scores than migrants 
out of this settlement category. Averages for the former class of movers are: 7.1 years 
of schooling, 100.0 in current occupational status, 73% competent in Hebrew, and 
10.9 years in Israel. 
27Amiran and Shachar (1969, p. 21) cite a net out-migration figure of 10,000, during 
the interval 1956-61, from the census category "new urban settlements" (which in- 
cludes approximately one-half the population in development towns). Lichfield (1971, 
1:6.2) reports a net out-migration of 43,800, between the years 1961 and 1967, from 
his list of development towns. 
28 Several development towns, in outlying areas, also supply agricultural workers. 
Since we are discussing the impact of the labor market in neighboring settlements, 
agricultural employment is deleted from this comparison. 
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ing evidence for this residence style among white-collar workers: educa- 
tional attainment by nonresidents employed in development towns is 
10.0 years of schooling, versus 6.6 years for inhabitants of the towns. 
These processes are responsible for the indirect effects of industrial 
structure that we wish to document. The inability of the settlements to 
retain their more resourceful and better-acculturated inhabitants, or at- 
tract comparable persons from other Israeli communities in substantial 
numbers, has meant that the settlers who remain tend to have high rates 
of dependency and related social problems. In 1963, 11.6% of families in 
development owns received continuous economic help, in comparison with 
4.4% in the total population. For all forms of assistance, the respective 
figures were 34.5%o and 17.4%o (Israel Manpower Planning Authority 
1964, p. 26). With regard to participation in education by youth, in the 
14-17-year age group, 41%o in development owns study full-time in some 
educational institution, compared with 68% in the entire country (Israel 
Manpower Planning Authority 1964, p. 11). Delinquency statistics are 
consistent with this picture. Using data from the Israel Ministry of 
Welfare's (1972) handbook of community characteristics, we calculated 
an incidence rate of 26.6 per 1,000 in the age group 9-16 for the 19 
development owns used in the previous computations. This figure com- 
pares with 14.3 for the country, and 16.4 for the three main cities. 
Even if the rates of incurring social problems in development owns by 
the ethnic and class groupings residing there were not greater than the 
rates these same populations exhibit in other communities, the mere fact of 
concentration of less resourceful families creates undesirable consequences. 
The low representation of moderate-status individuals in the towns and 
their high population turnover mean that local leadership tends to be 
weak29 (Lichfield 1971, 1:63), that the schools are not centers of ex- 
cellence, and that the clientele capable of supporting cultural activities is 
small. Despite grants-in-aid from the central government, hese settlements 
are hard pressed to collect adequate tax monies to provide for the mani- 
fold needs of their lower-class populations (Lichfield 1971, 1:5.16), not to 
mention the amenities which can make a community an attractive place of 
residence. Finally, because development owns are contexts in which de- 
pendency is common, there is a serious risk that it will become an approved 
life-style.30 
806 
29 At the same time, according to Aronoff (1973, pp. 42-44), the concentration of 
Asian-African populations in development towns has facilitated the emergence of 
political leadership in these ethnic groups. Since their populations dominate the 
electorates, local ethnic leaders have a more secure political base in the towns than 
in veteran settlements. 
30 In a recent study of factors which influence requests for a certain welfare allowance, 
Bar Yosef, Schild, and Varshar (1974) report that, after controls for personal need, 
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To clarify the preceding comments, and place them in perspective in 
relation to long-range prospects for the towns, we must stress two points. 
First, we have discussed development towns as if they formed a homogene- 
ous settlement category with regard to occupational composition and the 
presence of derivative problems. This is a reasonable first approximation 
to the reality, and an efficient analytic strategy considering that our 
interest is to elucidate the relation between community and ethnic stratifi- 
cation, and document the particular role played by industrial structure. 
However, it means ignoring the many differentiating mechanisms which 
have resulted in a few development owns constituting cases of successful 
progress, in that they attract settlers from diverse population groups via 
internal migration, retain their more talented residents, and have either 
acquired a diversified industrial base or were founded originally around 
industries which utilize a greater array of occupational skills than is the 
norm in the majority of the towns. 
Beersheva, Ashdod, and Arad are examples of successful development 
towns. Beersheva is now a regional center for southern Israel; it has a 
university, provides medical and commercial services for the surrounding 
region, and is able to support a varied white-collar labor force. Ashdod 
is a major seaport: Workers in shipping are well paid; also, the town has 
attracted ancillary manufacturing, transportation, and commercial firms 
that find it advantageous to be located in a maritime center. Arad is an 
isolated community near the Dead Sea which has been built around mineral 
extraction, chemical processing, and metal fabrication industries. These 
activities require engineers, technicians, and skilled craftsmen. Because of 
the settlement's isolation, these personnel, together with teachers, social 
workers, and others who provide professional services in the town, must 
live there, and consequently have a vested interest in its progress. Arad, 
in addition, is advantaged by social composition; a majority of its residents 
are Israeli born, and lack the many adjustment problems which confront 
new immigrants. Differentiating processes of considerable import therefore 
operate, and some settlements are following satisfactory development 
trajectories. However, a detailed consideration of these matters is outside 
the scope of this report. 
A second qualification concerns the fact that we are examining the towns 
at a very early point in their histories. The bulk of our data are from the 
1961 Census of Population; thus no development own is older than 13 
years, at least in its modern phase. Most are very small, having less than 
10,000 inhabitants, and their unbalanced industrial character stems 
partly from this size factor. However, because governmental policy is to 
encourage further growth, and because the immigrants now arriving in 
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development town has a strong, positive effect on application. 
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Israel come predominately from European countries and are better edu- 
cated than the earlier refugees, conditions exist for altering the industrial 
composition of the settlements. The amount of high-technology industry 
that would have to be introduced to provide reasonably balanced occupa- 
tional structures is not at present very great, and could be organized 
around the skills of the new immigrants in combination with a modest 
number of Israelis who might be attracted from veteran settlements. 
RELEVANCE OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR ETHNIC STRATIFICATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The processes we have described are very visible in Israel because of the 
huge immigration inflow this country has experienced in a brief time 
interval-far exceeding the rate of growth of the American population from 
immigration i any similar period-and because the government's e poused 
intention has been to settle the immigrants in new towns. Nonetheless, the 
importance of community for explaining ethnic stratification i the United 
States is also considerable, although the mechanisms that have brought 
immigrant groups to certain sections of the country, and to particular 
communities, are not identical with the ones which have operated in 
Israel. 
The sorts of mechanisms that have generated ethnic concentration by 
region and community in America concern time of arrival, route of travel, 
and degree of affinity of a group for its own kind. The first factor is 
associated with the processes we have described in connection with ethnic 
concentration in Israel. Immigrants from various lands came to America 
in different decades; and time of arrival correlates with location of the 
western frontier and, consequently, with period of settlement of a geo- 
graphic region. Route of travel is a consideration in explaining the concen- 
tration of certain groups-French-Canadians, Mexicans, and Chinese- 
who came via routes that were not followed by the majority of immigrants. 
These ethnics tend to be overrepresented in the states that border their 
ports of entry. 
The preference of individuals from the same country of origin to live in 
proximity to their own kind is also responsible for generating ethnic con- 
centration, although this factor does not explain where in American a 
group will choose to reside. Breton (1964) suggested that immigrants who 
are different from the receiving population on a number of dimensions- 
language, religion, cultural traditions-are likely to settle together in a 
community in order to constitute a clientele of sufficient size to support 
ethnic churches, schools, restaurants, newspapers, and Landsmanshaften. 
Once the initial migrants have established themselves in particular cities, 
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chosen for whatever reason, subsequent immigrants from the country of 
origin tend to travel to the same settlements. 
As a consequence of these processes, the correspondence of ethnicity 
with geographic region and community is quite strong. Scandinavians and 
Germans are concentrated in the Midwest; French-Canadians are located in 
northern New England; Italians are in southern New England and in the 
Mid-Atlantic states; and Jews, a heavily urban group, reside principally 
in New York City and Chicago. To cite instances of extreme ethnic 
concentration in states, 1920 census data on the foreign born reveal that 
Norwegians were represented in North Dakota at 15 times their national 
rate; French-Canadians were concentrated in New Hampshire at 27 times 
their rate in the country; and Mexicans were overrepresented in Arizona 
by a factor of 41 (Hutchinson 1956, pp. 34-48). It is also the case that 
first-generation American born continue to reside in the geographic regions 
of their parents; 1950 census data on natives of foreign or mixed paren- 
tage show representation rates of 19, 27, and 11 for the preceding three 
groups, in their respective states (Hutchinson 1956, pp. 39-43). 
The persistence of ethnic concentration means that regional and com- 
munity differences in industry location will have a stable impact on ethnic 
opportunity. There are striking differences among the immigrant groups 
in industry affiliation. This is principally a consequence of the industrial 
composition in the settlements where a group is concentrated, although the 
ethnic populations are themselves responsible for introducing several in- 
dustries into America-ready-made apparel manufacturing, for instance, 
is associated with Jewish immigrants (Hapgood 1966, p. 10). To illustrate 
the tendency toward ethnic concentration by industry, according to 1950 
census data on the foreign born, French-Canadians are employed in textile 
mills (a New England industry) at seven times their representation i the 
population. Mexicans work in farming at 11 times their expected rate, and 
in food processing at three times the expected rate (both industries have 
extensive operations in the Southwest and far west). Czechoslovakian and 
Yugoslavian immigrants are employed in primary metal processing at four 
times their representations in the country; these groups have large popu- 
lations in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois, which are centers of ferrous 
metalworks (Hutchinson 1956, pp. 224-31) .31 
Industry affiliation is an important consideration in the analysis of 
occupational standing and mobility for several reasons. Industries differ 
in technology and, as a consequence, in mix of occupations. Textile manu- 
facturing and food processing, for instance, contain few skilled manual 
positions, while the majority of the blue-collar work force in printing and 
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31 Industry concentration figures are based on data for operatives, except in the case 
of Mexicans in farming, for whom farm laborer figures were used. 
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in aircraft manufacturing is classified as skilled (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1963, pp. 506-12). The occupational distribution in an industry 
is one determinant of the mobility prospects facing an individual, and 
constrains his advancement o a greater or lesser extent, depending on 
the shape of the distribution, as long as he remains employed in that 
sector of the economy.32 Where communities are centers of a particular 
industrial activity, the occupational composition of the dominant industry 
has an even more pervasive effect on labor market opportunity; indeed, 
this is the situation that exists in many development owns in Israel. 
Industries differ in other respects which can influence an individual's 
occupational mobility prospects. In some, the firms characteristically fill 
their upper-manual positions by promotion from below; in other industries 
a craft model is the norm, which permits little possibility for upward 
movement. Demographic features of an industry are also relevant o under- 
standing mobility opportunity: some industries are expanding, and create 
new upper-manual nd white-collar positions which might be filled through 
promotion; others are stable or declining in employment, and present 
limited promotion prospects. Finally, industries differ in the age composi- 
tion of their employees, a consideration relevant o mobility, as it specifies 
the amount of promotion and replacement hiring that will take place in 
the short-term future. 
It is unfortunate that industry and community characteristics have 
been neglected in the main thrust of research on status attainment, which 
has focused exclusively on individual-level variables. This omission is 
especially serious in the study of ethnic stratification, since, as we have 
documented, ethnic groups tend to be concentrated by region and settle- 
ment, and are therefore exposed to different industrial structures. Analyses 
of occupational standing have commonly attributed the ethnic effects 
which remain after controls for individual characteristics (father's SES, 
respondent's education and status of first job, etc.) to cultural background 
or motivational differences among the groups (Duncan and Featherman 
1972). While we have no reason to doubt the salience of such factors for 
understanding ethnic stratification, we do suggest hat they are confounded 
in the residual ethnic terms with substantial industry and community 
effects. 
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